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Introduction
In 1788, Alexander Hamilton laid out a vision for the Supreme Court of the United
States in Federalist Paper #78. Hamilton wrote that in order for justices “to avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down
by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every
particular case that comes before them.”1 Indeed, non-arbitrary selection of cases
by the Supreme Court was seen as a foundational necessity for the Court if it was to
succeed in its role as the highest judicial body in a new democracy. Accordingly, Rule
10 of the most current Supreme Court Rules dictates that the Supreme Court should
pick which cases it hears based on a variety of non-arbitrary qualifications which fall
into two general characteristics: previous tension over the case among judicial entities
and dealing with “an important federal question”.2 [Admittedly, Rule 10 itself mentions
that its own content neither “control[s] nor fully measur[es] the Court’s discretion” but
does speak to the “character” of the type of cases the Supreme Court should hear.]
This paper seeks to analyze which types of cases are more likely to be heard by
the Supreme Court in hopes of understanding what constitutes an important federal
question in the eyes of the Court. Through a focused empirical analysis of the cases
chosen and not chosen to be heard by the Court, I set out to gain valuable information
on the nature of what the Court views as a salient judicial concern. By determining
the characteristics that make a case important on a federal level, it is possible to glean
knowledge on an array of fronts.
The first of these fronts is that the Supreme Court has long been viewed as an
institution that reflects national opinion and as such, an increased willingness by the
Supreme Court to hear a specific type of case could be indicative of the contemporary
relevance of that particular issue in public discourse. Second, to analyze the relationship
between the Court and public opinion in the opposite direction, a Supreme Court
tendency to grant a writ of certiorari more frequently to cases of a certain typology
may indicate that the Court is trying to influence the public discourse itself around
an issue that the justices (or at least the requisite four justices needed for a case to be
granted cert) find particularly relevant. It is this second perspective that was paramount
in my mind when initially thinking about which hypotheses regarding Supreme Court
behavior to propose.
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Third, and building off the previous point, the Court has a significant amount
of flexibility under Rule 10 in choosing which cases it hears, with essentially no
accountability structure governing its granting of certiorari. As such, there is tremendous
room for issue bias in the cert-granting process. Accordingly, this empirical study can
also help uncover potential issues that justices lean towards favoring or disfavoring –
findings which could even question the credibility of the 2013 Supreme Court living
up to the Hamiltonian ideal of a “non-arbitrary court”.
Overall, the ability for the Court to choose which cases it hears is a powerful
agenda-setting tool which could be highly indicative of the priorities of the public and
the Court. In this light, it is of academic and public import to be aware of the types
of cases which the Court views as significant – both in recognizing national judicial
concerns and in guiding the legal system on how to best approach Supreme Court
procedures in the future.
State of Previous Literature
While much academic energy has been expended on analyzing the processes of
the Supreme Court, the composition of the Court changes quite frequently, as do issues
of public importance. The purpose of this paper is to empirically explore the decisionmaking process of the Supreme Court in 2013 through scrutinizing cert-granting
patterns (for the reasons listed above) in the hopes of updating the literature on the
subject as well as testing the theories of previous Supreme Court scholarship.
To briefly explore the academic background on the topic, the classical tradition
of scholarship on Supreme Court cert-granting is best typified by Stuart Teger and
Douglas Kosinski in their 1980 study of the Court’s certiorari-giving tendencies.3
Teger and Kosinski present and refine the groundbreaking work on “Cue Theory” first
articulated by Joseph Tanenhaus in 1960. Cue Theory holds that the Supreme Court
grants writs of certiorari primarily based on certain indicators present in cases. Teger
and Kosinski’s study describes how Tanenhaus found statistical significance between
the Court granting a writ of certiorari to a case and the cues of 1) the federal government
as a petitioning party, 2) dissent between lower courts, and 3) civil liberties as an issue
in the case. Among other findings, the authors demonstrate that Tanenhaus’s theory
about the relevance of the federal government as a petitioning party is sustained across
the decades.
Nonetheless, the true starting point for my research was H.W. Perry’s seminal
1994 work, Deciding to Decide. In this book, Perry summarizes the myriad interviews
he conducted with Supreme Court justices and clerks at the time. Most important for
our purposes, he argues explicitly that specific signals guide Supreme Court decisionmaking. However, Perry asserts that these indicators are necessary but do not suffice
– they are only components in a larger process model whereby judges and their clerks
seek cases fitting a confined set of interdependent criteria.4 Perry does a spectacular
job of navigating through each of these individual signals then ultimately formulating
a final process model. Despite the more holistic approach emphasized by Perry, I test
many of Perry’s hypotheses in an isolated, more Tanenhaus-ian fashion. I do so in an
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effort to simply draw statistically significant findings and correlations that would give
credence to some of the additional signals that Perry theorizes as affecting the Court’s
deliberative process.
Most recently, in their study of federal judicial behavior around the country, Lee
Epstein, William Landes and Richard Posner argue that two sets of factors shape
judicial decision-making: ex-ante factors – pre-existing beliefs held by the justice,
and ex-post factors – post-appointment decisions. This paper focuses on the latter
– external factors about cases that affect or appeal to the sentiments of judges.5
Critical in the context of this paper’s study, Epstein, Landes and Posner emphasize
that the ideological inclinations of judges are very much apparent in courts today,
reinvigorating the empirical search for issue bias in judicial actions.6
Theory and Hypotheses
There are a variety of hypotheses suggested by academics in the field as to what
affects the thinking of Supreme Court justices in granting cert. The overarching goal of
testing for certain variables, in the context of my project, is to determine whether each
of these specific hypotheses about Supreme Court decision-making is supported by the
evidence at hand. The associated variables are merely proxies for larger hypothetical
questions.
The hypotheses I outline below were chosen for a variety of reasons, but mostly
because of their mention in previous scholarship or their relationship with other
relevant hypotheses. Some were included because of more recent trends in public
and legislative discourse that seemed salient and others because of personal notions
of what factors seemed relevant to the discussion of “important federal questions”.
There were also some hypotheses that I intentionally did not explore, including the
possible biases of the Court in favor of certain individual circuit court judges who
wrote the opinions on appeals or the potential proclivities towards particular counsels
/ litigants involved in the case. I overlooked these factors because I was unable to
reliably construct metrics for these hypotheses using the data on the Supreme Court
that was currently available.7
The central factor that this project focuses on as a barometer of Supreme Court
support for viewing a case as important is whether or not the Court granted a writ of
certiorari to a case. Analysis of cert-granting technique could demonstrate a proclivity
towards particular types of cases and shed empirical light on much of the theoretical
work conducted in the field. Sensibly, the variable used to measure differences in this
category is simply whether the case received cert or not.
Dependent Variable: Was the case granted a writ of certiorari? [Cert]
A Supreme Court that prefers federal stakeholders in the cases it takes could be
well-understood, especially given the guidelines set forth in Rule 10. Academics have
contended that the Supreme Court has shown a proclivity towards cases involving
federal government entities and it is clear that the hypothesis that the Supreme Court
believes federal government involvement to be a signal of an important case ought to
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at least be explored.8 Whether a federal government entity is the petitioner in the case
is a viable proxy for determining an answer to this question.
Independent Variable: Did a federal government entity (federal agency or Attorney
General) petition the case? [FedPet]
Whether or not a case involved a state or local-level government entity could
help us control for whether the effect of a federal government entity is related to it
simply being a government entity or it being federal in nature. There have also been
suggestions that a state/local petitioner could itself increase the likelihood of a case
being granted cert and be an indicator of a significant decision in the eyes of the
Court for similar reasons as a federal petitioner would.9 Independent Variable: Did
a state/local government entity (state agency or Attorney General) petition the case?
[StatePet]
The preference of the Court towards federal entities, theorized about above, could
play out elsewhere as well. Scholars have noted that there is an increased likelihood
of a case coming from a federal court of appeals rather than a state/district-level court
because of the increased likelihood of a federal question arising from federal courts.10
Independent Variable: Was the case appealed from a federal or state/district-level
court? [FedApp]
One of the most compelling strands of cases with which one would think the
Court would have to engage, especially given Rule 10, is a genuine legal conflict
between government entities themselves – as this would be indicative of a problem
of intrinsically broader public importance than settling a conflict between two private
entities.
Independent Variable: Was there a perceivable conflict between government entities at
hand in the case? [GovConf]
Similar to wanting to resolve potential intergovernmental disputes, the Court
could view its role as being an arbiter among lower courts that disagree, as explicitly
suggested by Rule 10. A variety of scholars have pointed out that the Supreme Court is
far more likely to hear a case that has already been disputed among the lower courts.11
The rationale is rooted in the supposed relationship between a case percolating among
lower courts and it having national significance, consequently being necessary for
the Supreme Court to settle.12 [Stern and Gressman do note the differential treatment
given to different types of disagreement between lower courts, and specifically note
that a conflict between a court of appeals and district court will not pique the interest of
the Court as much. Accordingly, any cases that were identified as ones of disagreement
between courts included notes in the dataset describing the Courts in disagreement.13
Ultimately, this point could not be explored further because of a shortage of data on
these types of cases. (See Appendix E)] Since the data of previous court disagreements
was extremely difficult to gather, as a metric for conflict between courts, I measured
the impact of such cases on cert-granting by utilizing the imperfect proxy of a case
being grouped together with other cases during proceedings (i.e. one measure of a
conflict among lower courts) on the likelihood that the Court would grant cert.
Independent Variable: Was there a perceivable conflict between courts over this issue?
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[CourtConf]
Continuing the investigation of the hypothesis of whether the Court views
involvement of certain governmental entities as particularly important, I examined the
role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court decision-making. Espoused as perhaps
the greatest indicator of whether a case will be taken up by the Supreme Court, whether
the Solicitor General recommends a case or not is an obvious variable to include if
we wish to understand how the Court views the participation of different government
entities and the executive branch in particular.14 Solicitor General argument of a case
could send a strong signal to the Court of the importance of a case to the government
of the United States. It is important to note that how prominently this variable features
could be affected by the presence of Justice Kagan, a former Solicitor General,
among the Court’s deliberations. Nonetheless, recent scholarship has hinted at the
diminishing number of cases and even a reduced importance of the Solicitor General
in cert-granting.15
Independent Variable: Did the Solicitor General petition the case? [SG]
The Supreme Court may be more inclined to think that cases involving a question
about the United States Constitution are more important in nature. Stern and Gressman
specifically note that certain Constitutional issues which seem distinctly important to
the Court are more likely to be heard.16 A Constitutional issue could reasonably be seen
by the justices as a fundamental federal question in need of resolution by the Supreme
Court.
Independent Variable: Was the case Constitutional in nature? [Const]
In line with the thinking expressed above, testing for the specific Constitutional
Amendment in question in a case could help hone in on potential issue bias in the
Supreme Court – where justices may have specific proclivities towards certain
Amendments.17 Perry notes that nearly every judge favors First Amendment cases and
there is a tendency among some justices towards Fourth Amendment cases. Stern and
Gressman similarly note that certain types of Constitutional cases were more likely to
receive cert.18 I included data on any Amendment that appeared in the cases for which
I ultimately used as a random sample.
Independent Variables: Did the case involve the:
- First Amendment [First]
- Fourth Amendment [Fourth]
- Fifth Amendment [Fifth]
- Sixth Amendment[Sixth]
- Seventh Amendment [Seventh]
- Eighth Amendment [Eighth]
- Tenth Amendment [Tenth]
- Eleventh Amendment [Eleventh]
- Fourteenth Amendment [Fourteenth]
Previous testing has shown increased rates of Supreme Court acceptance for
cases where an amicus brief was filed, which is sensible, as amicus briefs could lend
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support to the increased relevance of a case, much as the Solicitor General advocating
for the case would.19 Furthermore, testing for amicus briefs is particularly relevant
because it allows us to explore a federally-neutral device (unlike a Solicitor General or
government agency-related issue) that is still ostensibly impactful to those outside of
the parties arguing the claims themselves.
Independent Variable: Was an amicus brief filed? [Amic]
Testing for whether a case is criminal or civil in nature, could hone in on the
macro-level priorities of the Court – whether it prefers more criminal justice-oriented
cases or those which end civil disputes. It has been suggested that there is a significant
relationship between ideology and judicial voting in criminal cases, among other
categories. Perhaps this ideology translates into the cert-granting process as well.
Independent Variable: Was the case criminal in nature? [Crim]
As Perry mentions, the justices at least discuss the potential of granting cert to
any case involving a death penalty, automatically moving the case one step further in
the cert-granting process.20 As such, it is practical to test whether the justices in fact
do grant writs of certiorari to capital cases more frequently, given this “bump” in the
process model. The severity of a capital offense case could justify its closer scrutiny by
the Court in cert-granting and provide evidence for a slightly more empathetic Court.
Independent Variable: Did the case involve a capital offense? [CapOff]
In the context of criminal cases, we ought to be especially concerned with issue
bias, as these cases often involve deep violations of interpersonal rights in instances
where individuals may have emotional reactions. After reading through hundreds of
case summaries brought before the Supreme Court, it became evident that many of
them involved each of the below issues. Some of these issues were even cited by
Perry as areas where individual justices in the past have had intense interest. Testing
empirically for whether there is a difference in likelihood of these criminal cases being
heard could reveal potential issue biases on the Supreme Court.21 It is also worthy to
note there could be a negative correlation between some of these types of cases and
receiving a writ. A negative relationship could be due to these relatively frequentlyoccurring criminal acts having few national-level consequences.
Independent Variables: Did the case involve an issue related to:
- Murder? [Murder]
- Robbery? [Theft]
- Narcotics? [Narc]
- Sexual offenses? [Sex]
- Immigration / deportation? [Immig]
Health care in particular has become an increasingly important issue on the
national agenda, especially with the recent passage of the Affordable Care Act. In this
context, it is sensible to test for whether the 2013 Court felt compelled to grant more
writs of certiorari to cases which dealt with health care related issues.
Independent Variable: Did the case involve an issue related to health care [Health]
The Court may seek to avoid tax-related issues because of a lack of expertise or
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interest.22 Testing for whether the Court is hesitant to hear a tax-related issue could
help us uncover issue bias in this regard.
Independent Variable: Did the case pertain to tax-related issues? [Tax]
Perry mentions that the Supreme Court is less likely to hear cases that it considers
intractable – a situation where there is clear difficulty in coming to any clean resolution
that adds a concrete value beyond previous decisions.23 He offers child custody cases
as an example of such disputes. A negative correlation between child custody cases
could help us reveal Supreme Court discrimination in this regard.
Independent Variable: Did the case involve a child custody dispute? [ChCust]
Whether or not a case is related to Native American-centric issues has been
suggested as being of specific concern to particular justices on the bench and yet
another domain where issue bias may be present.24 It has been noted that judges from
western regions in the United States have historically favored hearing cases related to
Native American issues, with the rest of the Court mostly indifferent. On the Court
today, Justices Kennedy and Breyer hail from California, albeit from more urban areas
that may not have affected their views on Native American-related issues.25
Independent Variable: Did the case involve Native American-related issues?
[NatAmer]
Cases involving water rights may also be of specific concern to particular justices
on the bench. Like Native American-related issues, water rights tend to be of greater
interest to those from the West and could show the prevalence of issue preference on
the Court.26
Independent Variable: Did the case involve water rights? [Water]
As mentioned, the Court may be less willing to hear cases that involve “specialized”
issues, like taxation. Perry lists intellectual property / patent rights cases among those
that the Court may shun because of the intensely specialized nature, leaving it up to
lower courts with more experience in the matters at hand to rule on this line of cases.
27

Independent Variable: Did the case involve intellectual property / patent rights?
[Patent]
I also deduced that the Court may be more interested in race-related issues, which
justices have played a particularly significant role in over the past 60 years in shaping.
To test for this possibility, I tested for this using the medium of whether or not the case
seeking cert surrounded issues of affirmative action.
Independent Variable: Did the case involve affirmative action? [AffiAct]
Models
The levels of importance of each of the hypotheses and associated variables to the
thinking of the Court are not viewed equally by scholarship. As such, before exploring
the bivariate relationship between each variable and obtainment of cert, I sectioned the
variables into different groups or models based on the centrality I thought each would
play throughout the cert-granting process.
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From the outset I expected to see very strong relationships between a federal
government entity being involved in the case, a conflict between courts and the
Solicitor General petitioning the case. Based on Perry’s arguments, I thought two broad
categories would indicate areas of great national importance: 1) having a federal actor
involved in the case – either a federal government agency or the Solicitor General, or 2)
having conflicts between lower courts or between government entities. I also expected
to see strong relationships as well among cases involving an appeal from a federal
court, a state government entity as a petitioner and the case involving a Constitutional
issue. I was less confident about the strength of impact of an amicus brief, but still
included it as a potentially weighty concern because the level of investment that
interested parties show through issuing an amicus brief may be indicative of a seminal
type of case. Finally, I expected to see a strong negative relationship between the case
involving a criminal issue and being granted cert, as many criminal cases contest the
conviction of a defendant rather than truly present a case of national importance in the
eyes of the Court. Model “A” consisted of what I believed to be the core factors – the
most important characteristics of a case in influencing the Court’s decision to grant
cert or not. The variables included in Model “A” were:
- Did a federal government entity (federal agency or Attorney General) petition
the case?
- Did a state/local government entity (state agency or Attorney General)
petition the case?
- Was the case appealed from a federal or state/district-level court?
- Was there a perceivable conflict between government entities at hand in the
case?
- Was there a perceivable conflict between courts over this issue?
- Did the Solicitor General petition the case?
- Was the case Constitutional in nature?
- Was an amicus brief filed?
- Was the case criminal in nature?
In Model “B”, I analyzed new variables, which honed in on subsections of
constitutionality and criminal activity being present in the case, serving essentially as
control variables. I chose to include any Amendment which appeared while entering the
data. Of these Amendments, I expected the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to have significant connections with positive cert-granting because of their fundamental
roles in protecting the rights of citizens historically and the rich tradition of the Court
ruling on these issues. Because of some of the reasoning mentioned in the “Theory
and Hypotheses” section, I thought capital offenses may have been correlated with
higher rates of cert, as they receive an “extra step” in the judicial deliberative process.
Contrastingly, in more frequently occurring crime categories like sex offenses, theft
and narcotics, I expected negative correlations between the three variables and the
Court issuing certiorari. The variables tested in Model B were whether the case was one
involving a First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh or Fourteenth
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Amendment controversy (individually and then collectively) or which pertained to
a criminal activity that involved a capital offense, a murder, a theft, narcotics, a sex
offense, or immigration/deportation.
In Model C, I added on variables which I thought would be less conclusive and
have potentially less impact on cert-granting than those analyzed in Model A. I did
initially speculate that cases involving health care would be more likely to be heard
by the Court because of the importance of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (also known as “Obamacare”) in civil and political discourse at the time. I
also expected to see a slightly higher acceptance rate for cases involving affirmative
action because of the widespread and controversial impacts that those decisions could
have on the American public. I thought the remaining variables would be viewed by
the Court as particularistic issues that were far from intrinsic national importance but
still as variables that may affect decision-making because of reasons outlined in the
“Theory and Hypotheses” section.
The variables included in Model C were:
- Did the case involve a health care-related issue?
- Did the case involve a tax-related issue?
- Did the case involve a child custody dispute?
- Did the case involve a Native American-related issue?
- Did the case involve a water rights-related issue?
- Did the case involve an intellectual property / patent rights-related issue?
- Did the case involve an affirmative action-related issue?
Only after conducting analyses on the original three models put forth was I able to
utilize those findings and construct a “Final Model” of likely factors to consider when
analyzing the cert-granting process, which will all be discussed later on in the paper.
The variables initially included in this Final Model were:
- Did a federal government entity (federal agency or Attorney General) petition
the case?
- Was the case appealed from a federal or state/district-level court?
- Did the Solicitor General petition the case?
- Was the case Constitutional in nature?
- Was the case criminal in nature?
- Did the case involve a theft-related issue?
- Did the case involve a narcotics-related issue?
- Did the case involve a sexual offense-related issue?
On a whole, this Final Model seemed to yield conclusive results – showing that
the above factors were salient and the directional bivariate relationships held even
after controlling for the other characteristics that were deemed important. A lengthier
discussion of the findings will be provided later in the “Analysis of Results” section
of the paper.
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Data Sources
In order to conduct the empirical analysis of evaluating each of these variables
and their effects on cert-granting, a multi-layered analytical design was necessary.
This design was geared towards ultimately comparing a random sampling of the many
thousands of cases denied cert, to a nearly equal amount of cases granted cert, vis-à-vis
their respective characteristics and those characteristics’ subsequent effects on certgranting. The first step in setting up the design was conducting a random sample of the
7000+ cases denied writs of certiorari in 2013. To do so I downloaded the individual
PDF files of the order lists published and readily available online by the Supreme
Court between January 1st and December 31st 2013.28 Next, I individually extracted all
the data in the PDF files (i.e. case names and numbers) from each spreadsheet using
cut and paste methods and combining the data into Excel spreadsheets. I had one
spreadsheet for the data on cases granted cert, and one for the data on cases denied. As
I copied and pasted, I made sure not to include the portions of the order lists that dealt
with habeas corpus, writs of mandamus, re-hearings, attorney disciplines and other
procedures that were largely unimportant to cert-granting proceedings.
Using the statistical analysis program, STATA, I extracted a random sample of
150 cases from the 7376 cert-denied cases (STATA code is available in Appendix
A). For the cases positively granted cert I simply used all of the 122 cases available
from that year. In the process of conducting the random samples I often had to cut
and paste the case names into a single column, and frequently manipulated STATA
code techniques to formalize data input and appearance (see Appendix A for specific
techniques).
The next step in the experimental design was the data entry portion, for which
I utilized the LexisNexis Legal Research database. Using LexisNexis I searched for
summaries of the 150 randomly sampled cert-denied cases and the 122 cert-granted
cases. With these summaries in hand, I went through the tedious process of coding in
the answers to each of the variable questions outlined above for each of the cases. All
the data on the above variables was compiled manually using Microsoft Excel. A “0”
was coded if the case answered no to the hypothetical question posed by the variable
and a “1” was coded if it answered yes. In cases where the questions concerned whether
a case fell into a “federal” category or “state / local / district” category, a “1” signified
a federal category and a “0” the non-federal category.
After entering the data on all the variables for all the cases, I was left with a
small but sizeable amount of cases for which data was unavailable, and a final count
of 115 cert-granted cases and 109 cert-denied cases for which complete amounts of
data were available. Utilizing these final collections of data on variables, I was then
able to put forth a comprehensive analysis of the data and test for potential factors that
contributed to the granting or denial of writs of certiorari by the Supreme Court.
Analysis of Results
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To conduct the actual data analysis I once again utilized STATA tools (see
Appendix B for code). On a macro-level, in each of Models A, B and C, I regressed
each independent variable against whether or not the case had successfully been
granted cert. One of the critical tools used in conducting the analysis, outside of the
basic regression tools available through STATA, was STATA’s “p-weight” function.
This function allowed me to proportionally aggrandize all of the findings/data for
the sample of cases denied certiorari. In doing so, the p-weight function allowed me
to account for the fact that the cases denied cert were only a random sampling that
was reflective of a larger population. I also utilized the “outreg” function on STATA
to transfer the information neatly into more aesthetically appealing Microsoft Excel
tables.
At a base level, the following findings based on testing for a simple bivariate
relationship, visible in Appendix C, emerged:
Having a federal government entity as a petitioner in the case and having Solicitor
General involvement, were by far the most determinative factors in leading to a case
successfully receiving a writ of certiorari – respectively, each of these factors being
present in a case indicates an over 98.5% probability that the case will be granted cert.
Even moving dozens of standard deviations (which are .198% and .192% respectively)
outward in our analysis would still yield results that show at minimum a 95% likelihood
that such a case is heard if the variables are present. Either of those criteria virtually
guarantees the case will be heard by the Court. These findings are sensible given the
stated intuition about the Court’s prioritization of the involvement of federal players
in determining a case’s significance.
Similarly, cases originating from a federal court were shown to be statistically
significant to a case’s likelihood of being chosen by the Court (a 1.39% increase in
probability of being heard). Even at a 99%+ confidence interval, we are still virtually
guaranteed some relatively small impact from a federal appeal case on the Court’s
thinking. This finding could be approached as intuitive, given that federal courts may
be more likely to be hearing “important federal questions” but still have little say in
the types of cases they hear, with many “unimportant” cases inevitably clouding out
the higher proportion of salient ones.
Cases involving Constitutional issues had a similar relationship with receiving
cert, although the impact is also relatively small (less than 2% increase in probability
with standard deviations that kept a positive relationship within the 95% confidence
interval). The true importance of the Constitutional issue being present in the case may
have been clouded by more liberal Constitutional claims that I noticed while coding
the cases, including one case that was denied cert which involved a troubled woman
who made claims that were simply unintelligible by the lower courts. Additionally, as
expected, cases that pertained to a criminal lawsuit had a small but negative impact on
the case being taken up by the Court (a -2.23% effect). At a minimum, small effects of
Constitutional and criminal characteristics should be expected even at 95% and 99%
confidence intervals respectively. Overall these findings, compared with the above
findings on federal actors, seem to be in line with Tanenhaus’s findings nearly 50 years
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ago about federal agents having a sizeable impact on the Court’s decision-making
processes.
Conversely, whether or not the case involved a state or local government petitioner
accounted for over 18% of the likelihood of those cases receiving cert, although the
standard deviation of nearly 17% renders technically renders this factor not significant.
The reality is that the data is unclear about the effect of state/local government entities
on cert-granting. If we choose to analyze the relationship at two standard deviations out
in each direction, the effect of a state/local petitioner alone could contribute as much
as a 50% increase in the probability a case being granted cert, although the chance
of a serious negative relationship exists as well. I suspect that a genuine relationship
between state/local government petitioners and a case successfully receiving cert is
not showing because of the p-weight maneuver that I used to more heavily weight
the cases which were denied cert (i.e. because of the random sample) created too
large of a standard deviation for the relationship to be deemed statistically significant.
Nonetheless, a state or local government petitioner should still be deemed at-large as a
relevant factor. There was a similar effect with a conflict between government entities
being present in the case – a sizeable effect with a wide confidence interval.
Conflicts among the lower courts, shockingly, seem to have little discernable
influence on the decision for the Supreme Court to grant cert. Conflicts among
lower courts appeared to contribute to only a 1.8% uptick in cert-granting, with a
1.76% standard deviation – even at relevant confidence levels a relationship of the
significance originally suspected is unlikely to emerge. Admittedly, this finding is
likely be a function of the proxy used in the modeling, which only recognized those
cases which were noticeably coupled with other cases. The proxy variable used in this
case was simply not successful and in future analyses must be changed.
Model B yielded few significant relationships other than the negative correlations
between the case involving a sex, narcotics or theft-related offense and cert being
granted (-.77%, -1.01%, 1.4%). Nonetheless, the significance of theft and narcoticsrelated cases ostensibly vanished in the Final Model, which lends credence to the
idea that the effect of the case being criminal in nature was the true cause of that
relationship. At the same time the negative relationship between a sex offense case and
the case receiving cert withstood the “criminal” control, albeit at the p<.05 level and
not at the p<.01 level. This small-in-effect, but significant relationship could be due to
a relatively unexplored area of the way the Supreme Court sees sex crimes as germane
to the Court’s priorities in evaluating issues of national concern.
Surprisingly, certain Constitutional Amendments and capital offenses did not
show strong or significant relationships with being granted cert. This is particularly
surprising given the structurally-imposed extra scrutiny that the Court gives to capital
offenses early on. One theory for explaining the empirical results despite the known
boost given to such cases is that although the Court considers every capital offense, its
barrier to entry for being heard still must pass the same strict guidelines of every other
case, even if it involves a capital offense.
The apparent statistical significance of child custody and affirmative action cases
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(98.4% probability of each being heard, with tiny standard deviations) should be
regarded skeptically because the occurrence of these cases were exceedingly rare, as
evident in the cross-tabulations in Appendix E. Only three child custody cases and only
one affirmative action-related case were involved in this study. Health care as a part of
the case seems to have some impact (a 7.06% jump), but the wide confidence interval
of over 8% clouds its statistical profundity – the numbers bear some relation to that of
the impact of a state/local government entity. The lack of health care cases identified
(only 7 total) again may have been the reason for the wide standard deviations.
The results of Models A, B and C yielded interesting results that corroborate some
of my initial thoughts about how the variables would connect with cert-granting and
demonstrate some larger insights to the general hypotheses that the variables were
originally geared towards exploring.
In an effort to fully capture and incorporate the results of my findings, I compiled
the above variables that were shown to have statistically significant effects on Supreme
Court decision-making in relation to certiorari-granting into an aforementioned “Final
Model”. This Final Model, as described in my “Theory and Hypotheses” section,
controlled for each of the significant variables for the effects of the others. The emergent
findings confirmed that all the relationships held, except for those previously shown
between theft and narcotics and cert-granting. As mentioned, it is likely that controlling
for the negative effects of a criminal case took away the statistical significance of those
relationships.
Other Confounding Factors
Any complete discussion of the relationship between these variables and
corroboration of the hypotheses must note the significant amount of confounding and
problematic factors that arose throughout the course of the analysis.
First and foremost, the usage of cert-granting as a medium for determining that
the Court views a case as dealing with “an important federal question” may be flawed.
Perry spends at least a chapter discussing the details of strategic cert-granting, which
could result in cases favored by certain justices still not being granted for tactical
considerations (or vice versa, theoretically). Moreover, the Supreme Court often does
not hear a case simply because a similar case may be, for example, settled in the Court
of Appeals or another lower court, or a similar case is before the Supreme Court itself.29
In such a situation, cases containing statistically significant characteristics would still
have virtually no chance of being heard by the Court. An additional factor – whether a
case involves an important statutory issue – which is difficult to test for given the data
being used, has also been noted as a factor which could be important in affecting the
Court’s decision to hear a case. It was nearly impossible to discern whether a case was
dealing with a high-profile statutory concern from the data at hand.
An additional issue in this study was that there was missing data on 7 cases that
were granted cert and 41 cases that were denied cert because of an inability to locate
full summaries on LexisNexis. Perhaps cases with missing data, in and of themselves
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have characteristics which may have affected the data analysis and its results.
Simple human error should also be noted – coding thousands of zeroes and ones
in a relatively short time frame into Microsoft Excel is bound to produce mistakes of
a sort. It is important to note that I cleaned up datasets after doing random sampling
– standardizing format and often decoupling case names and numbers from the same
cells, which undoubtedly increased the possibility of human error as well.
Another central limitation in any study of cert-granting technique is bound to be
the dearth of cases successfully granted writ, which inhibits larger sample sizes to test
for types of cases like affirmative action and health care.
In analyzing the retinue of cases before me, I also did not combine situations
of multiple cases heard one after the other (but not in tandem) by the Court, which
involved nearly the identical conflict as another case (somewhere between 2 and 15
cases total in the samples were affected) – this may have affected the integrity of the
findings as well.
Looking specifically at the results that a case coming from a federal court is more
likely to be heard, state court cases are often denied for jurisdictional reasons, too. 30
As such, if there were an efficient way of controlling for cases denied based on strictly
jurisdictional grounds, the effect of a federal court on the cert-granting process may be
diminished.
In the particular case of Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice,
cert was granted then dismissed as improvidently granted. I did not take into account
the subsequent dismissal of the case. Because the Court found reason enough to grant
it cert in the first place I thought it to be relevant for our empirical analysis of the
thought that goes into the Supreme Court cert-granting process.
Conclusion
After considering the results in totality from the four models utilized to test my
initial hypotheses, I think it is possible to draw a few general conclusions. First, we see
little indication of substantial issue bias within the Supreme Court. In virtually every
area where a feasible concern was brought that could cloud judicial non-arbitrariness,
no statistical bias was observed. From tax-related cases and those involving health
care to the slew of individual Amendments and rights-related cases in Model C, the
Court showed, overall, no discernable or quantifiable preference for a distinct type of
case. These findings on specific issues seem to present a Court that, in general, lives up
to the ideal of Hamiltonian non-arbitrariness in its actions. The only potential specific
issue biases that emerged were against criminal cases overall, with a slight favoritism
against cases that involved sex offenses, albeit with tiny effect sizes.
Putting the content of the cases aside though, the Court seems to prioritize cases
that involve certain “federal brand names” – i.e. federal government agencies, federal
courts, the Solicitor General and the United States Constitution. All these indicators
point to the idea that the Supreme Court believes important federal questions are
present in cases that involve easily identifiable federal features. In comparison to the
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inconclusive results on cases involving state government entities, conflict between
government entities and lower court conflicts, the presence of federal subject matter
seems to lead to the case being held in higher regard by the Court. Furthermore,
fascinatingly, no single Constitutional Amendment appeared to pique the interest of
the Court, but rather the fact that a case alone was generally Constitutional warranted
its closer scrutiny. This phenomenon lends us to believe that a case bearing federal
branding, such as Constitutionality or Solicitor General involvement is pivotal to the
Court’s thinking – rather than the actual content matter of the case. This implication has
been explored by academics since Tanenhaus, who have recognized that identifiably
federal signals exist and that the Court utilizes them heavily.
Nonetheless, the findings on connections between national-level indicators and
cert-granting is most interesting in the context of the lack of a clear relationship
between so many other factors – like the case containing an amicus brief, the case
dealing with a capital offense or the case involving a murder. In these above situations,
the case most likely bears serious consequences for a party or outside entity, but has
not been given a similar type of priority as federal factors have been given.
Combining these conclusions together, a central mindset on the Court appears to
emerge – it seems to strive, in the cert-granting process, to deal with cases that prima
facie deal with national precedent rather than actually prioritize the potential injustice
within the content matter of the case. The lack of priority given for capital offenses,
murders, amicus briefs and even state governments in the context of the priority given
to federal factors indicates, as scholars have noted over time, that the Court is less
concerned with justice and more concerned with wider precedent.
The question remains if this is the true role that the Court should be playing.
Should favoritism be given to a face-value definition of what consists of an “important
federal question”, or could the interpretation of that clause perhaps be opened up, as
well, to include personal complaints of large-caliber injustice to specific parties? Will
we see a day when the Court views a case involving federal agencies with the same
scrutiny that they do one involving a capital offense? Do cases that involve a federal
indicator actually imply that a case is dealing with an “important federal question”?
Would we prefer a Court that is more geared towards a content-based analysis, even if
that entails some issue bias in the process?
These questions are important in thinking about the role of the Court even outside
the certiorari-granting maneuvers discussed in the paper. Envisioning a Court that is
more focused on retail justice than wholesale precedent could encourage lower courts,
especially in criminal cases, to approach each criminal situation with a greater level
of scrutiny. In an age of mandated sentences and mass incarceration, a Court that
gives at least an equal level of attention to the cases of individuals could encourage an
increased focus on justice throughout the United States judicial system.
Simultaneously, it is understandably quite difficult for the Court to balance the
manifold priorities it has. The potential imbalance in cert-granting could be indicative
of a larger need to reform the current structure of the Supreme Court and its processes.
The current state of hearing approximately 100+ out of 7000+ cases presented each
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year may simply not be sustainable to fill the role that the Court needs to serve in the
American public – especially with the number of cases petitioned rapidly increasing.
A re-evaluation of the structure, process and time allocations of the Supreme Court
could be an important next step in rethinking the role of the Supreme Court in modern
American government and society.
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Appendix A – STATA Code for Random Sample
Cert-Denied Cases
clear all
import excel “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\010413.xls”, clear sheet(“Table 1”)
label var A “case”
label var B “other1”
label var C “other2”
label var D “other3”
tostring A B C D, force replace
save “Cert2013.dta”, replace
import excel “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\010713.xls”, clear sheet(“Table 1”)
label var A “case”
label var B “other1”
label var C “other2”
label var D “other3”
tostring A B C D, force replace
append using “Cert2013”, force
save “Cert2013.dta”, replace
…
gen goodline = 0
replace goodline = 1 if substr(A, 3, 1) == “-”
order goodline
edit
replace goodline = 4 in 1981
keep if goodline == 1
edit
gen casename = B + C + D
order casename
set seed 123456
sample 150, count
save “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalSampleCertDenied2013.dta”, replace
export excel using “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalSampleCertDenied2013.xls”,
replace
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Cert-Granted Cases
clear all
import
excel
“C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\CertGranted2013.xls”,
sheet(“Sheet1”)
label var A “case”
label var B “other1”
label var C “other2”
save “CertGranted2013.dta”, replace

clear

gen goodline = 0
replace goodline = 1 if substr(A, 3, 1) == “-”
order goodline
edit
keep if goodline == 1
edit
gen casename = B + C + E
order casename
save “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalSampleCertGranted2013.dta”, replace
export excel using “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalSampleCertGranted2013.xls”
Appendix B – STATA Code for Models A, B, C and Final
Model A
clear all
//ssc install outreg2
import excel “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalData.xls”, sheet(“Sheet1”) firstrow
gen sampleprob = 1 / 1 if Cert == 1
replace sampleprob = 7376 / 116 if Cert == 0
//116(denied cases sampled)/7376(total denied cases in 2013)
regress Cert FedPet [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableA.xls, replace
regress Cert StatePet [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableA.xls, append
regress Cert FedApp [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableA.xls, append
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regress Cert GovConf [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableA.xls, append
regress Cert CourtConf [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableA.xls, append
regress Cert SG [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableA.xls, append
regress Cert Const [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableA.xls, append
regress Cert Amic [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableA.xls, append
regress Cert Crim [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableA.xls, append
save “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalRegressionsModelA.dta”, replace
Model B
clear all
//ssc install outreg2
import excel “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalData.xls”, sheet(“Sheet1”) firstrow
gen sampleprob = 1 / 1 if Cert == 1
replace sampleprob = 7376 / 116 if Cert == 0
//116(denied cases sampled)/7376(total denied cases in 2013)
regress Cert First [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableB.xls, replace
regress Cert Fourth [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableB.xls, append
regress Cert Eighth [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableB.xls, append
regress Cert Fourteenth [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableB.xls, append
regress Cert First Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh Eighth Tenth Eleventh Fourteenth
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[pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableB.xls, append
regress Cert CapOff [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableB.xls, append
regress Cert Murder [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableB.xls, append
regress Cert Theft [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableB.xls, append
regress Cert Narc [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableB.xls, append
regress Cert Sex [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableB.xls, append
regress Cert Immig [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableB.xls, append
save “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalRegressionsModelB.dta”, replace
Model C
clear all
//ssc install outreg2
import excel “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalData.xls”, sheet(“Sheet1”) firstrow
gen sampleprob = 1 / 1 if Cert == 1
replace sampleprob = 7376 / 116 if Cert == 0
//116(denied cases sampled)/7376(total denied cases in 2013)
regress Cert Health [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableC.xls, replace
regress Cert Tax [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableC.xls, append
regress Cert ChCust [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableC.xls, append
regress Cert NatAmer [pweight = sampleprob], robust
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outreg2 using RegressionTableC.xls, append
regress Cert Water [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableC.xls, append
regress Cert Patent [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableC.xls, append
regress Cert AffiAct [pweight = sampleprob], robust
outreg2 using RegressionTableC.xls, append
save “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalRegressionsModelC.dta”, replace
Final Model
clear all
//ssc install outreg2
import excel “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalData.xls”, sheet(“Sheet1”) firstrow
gen sampleprob = 1 / 1 if Cert == 1
replace sampleprob = 7376 / 116 if Cert == 0
//116(denied cases sampled)/7376(total denied cases in 2013)
regress Cert FedPet FedApp SG Const Crim Theft Narc Sex[pweight = sampleprob],
robust
outreg2 using FinalRegressionTable.xls, replace
save “C:\Users\krb-user73\Desktop\FinalRegressionsFinalModel.dta”, replace
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Appendix C – Regression tables for Models A, B, C and Final
Model A

VARIABLES
FedPet
StatePet
FedApp
GovConf

(1)
Cert
0.985***
(0.00198)

(2)
Cert

0.187
(0.166)

(3)
Cert

0.0139***
(0.00358)

CourtConf

(4)
Cert

0.0837
(0.0960)

SG

(5)
Cert

0.0180
(0.0176)

Const

(6)
Cert

0.986***
(0.00192)

Amic
Crim
Constant

(7)
Cert

0.0122**
(0.00589)

(8)
Cert

(9)
Cert

0.184
(0.115)

-0.0223***
(0.00805)
0.0145*** 0.0142*** 0.00579*** 0.0155*** 0.0155*** 0.0139*** 0.0127*** 0.0122*** 0.0334***
(0.00198) (0.00196) (0.00214) (0.00208) (0.00212) (0.00192) (0.00214) (0.00176) (0.00783)

Observations
224
224
224
R-squared
0.111
0.024
0.002
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

224
0.004

224
0.001

224
0.146

224
0.002

224
0.046
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Model B
VARIABLES
First
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Tenth
Eleventh
Fourteenth
CapOff

(1)
Cert
0.00231
(0.0113)

(2)
Cert

0.00862
(0.0139)

(3)
Cert

(4)
Cert

(5)
Cert

0.00964
(0.0199)
0.00859
(0.0142)
0.0138
(0.0209)
-0.000802
(0.00901)
-0.0121
(0.0421)
0.0143
0.0264
(0.0364)
(0.0410)
-0.000403
(0.0222)
-0.0135
(0.0236)
-0.00711 -0.0120
(0.00598) (0.0110)

Murder

(6)
Cert

0.00604
(0.0109)

Theft

(7)
Cert

0.00430
(0.00674)

Narc

(8)
Cert

-0.00771*
(0.00461)

Sex
Immig
Constant

-0.0101**
(0.00400)

(10)
Cert

(11)
Cert

-0.0140***
(0.00361)

-0.00884
(0.00709)
0.0162*** 0.0159*** 0.0162*** 0.0168*** 0.0159*** 0.0159*** 0.0156*** 0.0174*** 0.0182*** 0.0175*** 0.0166***
(0.00220) (0.00217) (0.00215) (0.00229) (0.00246) (0.00219) (0.00228) (0.00245) (0.00261) (0.00237) (0.00223)

Observations
224
224
224
R-squared
0.000
0.000
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.000
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224
0.000

224
0.000

224
0.000

224
0.001

224
0.001
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Model C

VARIABLES
Health
Tax
ChCust
NatAmer

(1)
Cert
0.0706
(0.0855)

(2)
Cert

0.0571
(0.0744)

(3)
Cert

0.984***
(0.00212)

Water

(4)
Cert

0.0143
(0.0364)

Patent
AffiAct
Constant

(5)
Cert

-0.000846
(0.0218)

(6)
Cert

(7)
Cert

0.0646
(0.0566)

0.984***
(0.00214)
0.0156*** 0.0158*** 0.0159*** 0.0162*** 0.0163*** 0.0151*** 0.0162***
(0.00210) (0.00211) (0.00212) (0.00215) (0.00217) (0.00205) (0.00214)

Observations
224
224
224
R-squared
0.003
0.002
0.026
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

224
0.000

224
0.000

224
0.005

224
0.009
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Final Model

VARIABLES
FedPet
FedApp
SG
Const
Crim
Theft
Narc
Sex
Constant

(1)
Cert
0.845***
(0.0817)
0.0124***
(0.00372)
0.878***
(0.0592)
0.00923*
(0.00534)
-0.0138**
(0.00695)
-0.00168
(0.00524)
-0.00455
(0.00491)
-0.00942**
(0.00399)
0.0130**
(0.00564)

Observations
224
R-squared
0.233
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix D – Code for cross-tabulations of cert for each variable
clear all
import excel “C:\Users\krb-user74\Desktop\FinalData.xls”, sheet(“Sheet1”) firstrow
//ssc install logout
logout, clear: tab Cert FedPet
logout, save(CrossTab.xml) clear excel replace
clear all
import excel “C:\Users\krb-user74\Desktop\FinalData.xls”, sheet(“Sheet1”) firstrow
//ssc install logout
logout, clear: tab Cert StatePet
logout, save(CrossTab.xml) clear excel replace
…
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Appendix E – Cross-tabulations of cert for each variable
“1” indicates that a case tested positively for the variable; “0” indicates that it tested
negatively.
FedPet
Cert
0
1
Total

0
109
102
211

1
0
13
13

Total
109
115
224

StatePet
Cert
0
1
Total

0
108
99
207

1
1
16
17

Total
109
115
224

FedApp
Cert
0
1
Total

0
27
10
37

1
82
105
187

Total
109
115
224

GovConf
Cert
0
1
Total

0
108
108
216

1
1
7
8

Total
109
115
224

CourtConf
Cert
0
1
Total

0
104
104
208

1
5
11
16

Total
109
115
224

SG
Cert
0
1
Total

0
109
98
207

1
0
17
17

Total
109
115
224
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Const
Cert
0
1
Total

0
77
63
140

1
32
52
84

Total
109
115
224

First
Cert
0
1
Total

0
104
109
213

1
5
6
11

Total
109
115
224

Fourth
Cert
0
1
Total

0
104
107
211

1
5
8
13

Total
109
115
224

Fifth
Cert
0
1
Total

0
105
109
214

1
4
6
10

Total
109
115
224

Sixth
Cert
0
1
Total

0
102
108
210

1
7
7
14

Total
109
115
224

Seventh
Cert
0
1
Total

0
108
114
222

1
1
1
2

Total
109
115
224

Eighth
Cert
0
1
Total

0
108
113
221

1
1
2
3

Total
109
115
224
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Tenth
Cert
0
1
Total

0
108
114
222

1
1
1
2

Total
109
115
224

Eleventh
Cert
0
1
Total

0
108
115
223

1
1
0
1

Total
109
115
224

Fourteenth
Cert
0
1
Total

0
101
110
211

1
8
5
13

Total
109
115
224

Amic
Cert
0
1
Total

0
107
84
191

1
2
31
33

Total
109
115
224

Crim
Cert
0
1
Total

0
25
55
80

1
84
60
144

Total
109
115
224

CapOff
Cert
0
1
Total

0
102
105
207

1
7
10
17

Total
109
115
224

Murder
Cert
0
1
Total

0
92
93
185

1
17
22
39

Total
109
115
224
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Theft
Cert
0
1
Total

0
93
105
198

1
16
10
26

Total
109
115
224

Narc
Cert
0
1
Total

0
88
104
192

1
21
11
32

Total
109
115
224

Sex
Cert
0
1
Total

0
100
113
213

1
9
2
11

Total
109
115
224

Immig
Cert
0
1
Total

0
105
113
218

1
4
2
6

Total
109
115
224

Health
Cert
0
1
Total

0
108
109
217

1
1
6
7

Total
109
115
224

Tax
Cert
0
1
Total

0
108
110
218

1
1
5
6

Total
109
115
224

ChCust
Cert
0
1
Total

0
109
112
221

1
0
3
3

Total
109
115
224
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NatAmer
Cert
0
1
Total

0
108
113
221

1
1
2
3

Total
109
115
224

Water
Cert
0
1
Total

0
108
114
222

1
1
1
2

Total
109
115
224

Patent
Cert
0
1
Total

0
107
104
211

1
2
11
13

Total
109
115
224

AffiAct
Cert
0
1
Total

0
109
114
223

1
0
1
1

Total
109
115
224
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